On March 27, 2025, the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as „the Supreme Cout”) presented its first position on the interpretation of Acts No. 116/2020 Coll. and No. 569/2020 Coll., through which the Czech Republic formally acknowledged its liability for harm caused by adverse effects resulting from COVID-19 vaccination and mandatory vaccination.

The Supreme Court suspended proceedings in which the interpretation of these laws is pivotal to our Client’s claim and thereby submitted a proposal to the Constitutional Court to annul the provisions requiring so-called “particularly serious bodily harm” so-far presented as a condition for compensation. We welcome the Supreme Court’s agreement with our position that this disproportionately strict and clearly unjust requirement should be excluded from both laws.

Core of the Dispute and the Cassation Argumentation

Our law firm represents a Client who suffered adverse effects following a COVID-19 vaccination, specifically effects anticipated by an implementing regulation. His claim was rejected both by the Ministry of Health and subsequently by the courts of first and appellate instance, on the grounds that the consequences did not constitute “particularly serious bodily harm.” The Ministry of Health, referring to the compensation laws, holds (in our opinion, incorrectly) that no entitlement arises unless the statutory condition of “particularly serious bodily harm” is met.

In February 2024, acting on behalf of our Client, we filed an appeal which the Supreme Court has now resolved by proposing the annulment of those statutory provisions that require the presence of the so called “particularly serious bodily harm”, with the intention to generally dismiss the requirement of “particular seriousness”.

The core issue of the dispute between our Client and the Ministry of Health has been the interpretation of Acts No. 116/2020 Coll. and No. 569/2020 Coll., particularly regarding the scope of the state’s liability for harm resulting from the vaccinations in question and the right to compensation for adverse effects.

The key questions, in simplified terms, are:

– the interpretation of the term “particularly serious bodily harm”;

– the textual differences between Acts No. 116/2020 Coll. and 569/2020 Coll.;

– the compatibility of the laws with the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and the fundamental right to health protection.

From our point of view, the arguments presented are not mutually exclusive but rather fully compatible, leading to the conclusion that the law must be interpreted in a manner that enhances the protection of the fundamental right to health and personal integrity, and is always consistent with the right to fair compensation.

On the Concept of “Particularly Serious Bodily Harm”

The Ministry of Health has consistently maintained the position that compensation should be granted only to those victims who have suffered so-called „particularly serious bodily harm,“ as this is a condition expressly stated in the compensation acts. This interpretation is based on a legal statement issued by the Civil and Commercial Division of the Supreme Court in its decision dated 27 June 2019, Case No. 25 Cdo 4210/2018, which concerned the application of Section 2959 of the Civil Code. According to that decision:

– „In defining the concept of particularly serious bodily harm, it is necessary to focus primarily on the severity of the consequences for the primary victim. This will typically involve the most serious forms of health damage, such as comatose states, severe brain injuries, or extensive paralysis—i.e., consequences comparable to the death of a close person, where the mental anguish of secondary victims reaches a significantly higher intensity. This refers to mental suffering (grief, feelings of despair and hopelessness, fear) connected with the awareness that the affected person has been permanently excluded from most spheres of social engagement and has become someone afflicted with an exceptionally adverse state of health.“

– Furthermore, in the same decision, the Supreme Court stated that: „It may also involve cases of extremely severe injuries that pose a long-term threat to the life of the primary victim or burden them with a significantly adverse health condition over a prolonged period.“[1]

In other words, according to the Ministry of Health, compensation for harm to health essentially belongs only to those who, in effect, no longer possess any meaningful health. It is important to emphasize, however, that in the above referenced case from the year 2019, the Supreme Court was addressing the issue of compensation for secondary victims, whereas in the present matter, this strict (and, in the context of the Supreme Court’s proposal, unconstitutional) standard has been applied by the general courts to primary victims, which the Supreme Court has also taken into account.

On this matter, the Supreme Court, with reference to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and the Constitutional Court’s decision dated 16 February 2021, Case No. I. ÚS 3449/19, stated that:

“The language of the Convention and the cited decision of the Constitutional Court makes it clear that compensation for harm to health caused by vaccination must be fair, which is not fulfilled by the restrictive formulation used in the law. The Supreme Court thus concludes that limiting the claim by requiring particularly serious bodily harm is inconsistent with the constitutional order of the Czech Republic.”[2]

Unresolved Legal Question – “Discrepant” Wording of Acts No. 116/2020 Coll. and No. 569/2020 Coll.

Another unresolved legal issue, not previously addressed by the Supreme Court’s case law, concerns the textual discrepancy between Acts No. 116/2020 Coll. and No. 569/2020 Coll. Before the Supreme Court stood the question of interpreting Act No. 569/2020 Coll., which—at least grammatically—differs in key respects from the “primary” Act No. 116/2020 Coll.

As a result of this discrepancy, there is doubt as to whether the requirement of “particularly serious bodily harm” also applies to claims under Act No. 569/2020 Coll., despite the Supreme Court’s opinion that the current wording of both laws is problematic.

The fundamental inconsistency in the wording of the two acts was raised on behalf of our Client from the outset and also argued before the Supreme Court, given that this discrepancy is readily apparent. The difference is rather apparent in the Czech language, yet the difference lies in the following:

– Section 2(1) of Act No. 116/2020 Coll., as a lex generalis, provides: “§ 2 – Scope of Compensation for Damage (1) The State shall compensate a person who has undergone mandatory vaccination administered by a healthcare provider (hereinafter referred to as the ‚vaccinated person‘) where, as a result of such vaccination, the vaccinated person suffers particularly serious bodily harm, pain and suffering, loss of income, and impairment of social engagement. In such cases, the State shall also reimburse the reasonable costs associated with the care of the vaccinated person, including personal or household assistance, incurred by the person providing it.”

– By contrast, Section 2 of Act No. 569/2020 Coll., as a lex specialis, provides: “§ 2 – Compensation for Harm Caused to a Vaccinated Person by a Medicinal Product Containing a Vaccine for COVID-19 (1) The State shall compensate a person who received a medicinal product as per Section 1(1) for harm caused by that product, if, as a result of such vaccination, the person suffered particularly serious bodily harm, pain and suffering, loss of income, or impairment of social engagement. The assessment of such harm and the scope of compensation shall be governed analogously by Act No. 116/2020 Coll., on Compensation for Damage Caused by Mandatory Vaccination.”

In other words, under Act No. 116/2020 Coll., it is clear that the State provides compensation for:

1. Pain and suffering,

2. Loss of income, and

3. Impairment of social engagement caused by mandatory vaccination,

only if the vaccination resulted in particularly serious bodily harm.

However, under Act No. 569/2020 Coll., the State compensates for harm caused by the COVID-19 vaccine if:

1. Particularly serious bodily harm occurred,

2. Pain and suffering occurred,

3. Loss of income occurred, or

4. Impairment of social engagement occurred.

Though the difference might be lost in translation to English, the claim is that the difference wording allows for interpretation of the latter Act in a matter, where the “particularly serious bodily harm” is not a condition.

While the Ministry and general courts have so far downplayed this difference, we argued on behalf of our Client that regardless of whether the discrepancy stems from legislative intent or drafting error, it must be interpreted in favor of the citizen as the recipient of the legal norm. This interpretation is justified on multiple grounds, including the context of the right to fair compensation.

It must be recognized that many people, based on a good faith reading of the literal wording of both acts, may have reasonably concluded that the legislator intended different conditions for COVID-19 vaccinations by deliberately using distinct language. This good faith belief further motivated them to undergo vaccination in the interest of public health – a measure the State actively encouraged at the time through promotional campaigns and coercive emergency measures.

It is important to recall that COVID-19 vaccinations were administered during lockdowns, with the use of the “Tečka” and “čTečka” apps for unlawful controls, alongside massive campaigns in which vaccinated persons were inappropriately offered prizes such as mobile phones or sneakers.

In this regard, we also presented to the Supreme Court the entire legislative process, explanatory memoranda, and supporting materials from which our interpretation can be reasonably derived.

We further cited the opinion of the Constitutional Court in decision I. ÚS 22/99 dated 2 February 2000, which stated: “In a rule-of-law state, a court must not correct the legislature’s mistakes in drafting statutes by interpreting them in a way that changes a constitutionally compliant, but in the state’s view inconvenient, provision.”

Although an interpretation of the law in favor of the addressee of the law seems self-evident, the Supreme Court, in our view correctly, stated procedurally that it cannot adopt an interpretation of the law “which would substitute the legislative power of the State and thereby disturb the principle of separation of powers. As a result, the Supreme Court has no option but to submit the matter to the Constitutional Court under Article 95(2) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic, and to propose the annulment of the disputed parts of both legislative provisions, so as to allow room for a meaningful judicial interpretation.”

Although the alternative of interpreting the law in such a way that courts could grant compensation without legislative amendment is logical, we welcome the Supreme Court’s unambiguous proposal to annul the relevant sections of the acts. It sends a clear message that claimants should not be forced to rely on the chance that justice will ultimately be found for them by the courts—as has been the prevailing case so far in vaccine injury compensation matters.

Any interpretation or statutory wording that so narrowly restricts the right to compensation for harm to health that it would only apply to individuals who effectively no longer have any health cannot, by any standard, be deemed fair. Such an interpretation is, if nothing else, contrary to Article 24 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. Were the requirement of particularly serious harm to be upheld, the right to fair compensation would become entirely illusory which is plainly unacceptable and incompatible with the State’s international obligation to provide such fair compensation.

Assessment of Case Law and the Current Legal Framework

In its proposal to annul the law, the Supreme Court also took into account the objections we raised regarding the existing case law and its reflection in the compensation acts. In the cassation appeal filed on behalf of our Client, we argued that prior to the adoption of the compensation laws, the route to compensation was based solely on the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, but was not seemingly limited by the requirement of „particularly serious bodily harm“—a condition that first appeared in Act No. 116/2020 Coll.

The Supreme Court recalled that, as early as in its decision of 27 January 2015, Case No. Pl. ÚS 19/14, the Constitutional Court criticized the absence of statutory regulation on the State’s liability for harm caused by vaccination and called on the legislature to “seriously consider amending the legal framework of mandatory vaccination against infectious diseases to include provisions on the State’s liability for the aforementioned consequences.”

Following the adoption of Act No. 116/2020 Coll., the Supreme Court sought to bridge the legislative delay through judicial interpretation (cf. Supreme Court judgment of 26 August 2021, Case No. 25 Cdo 2479/2020), in which it essentially held that claims arising prior to the enactment of Act No. 116/2020 Coll. should also be assessed under that statute—even at the cost of the so-called “true retroactivity”.

However, in the context of the current annulment proposal, it is now evident that the Supreme Court acknowledges that even such case law, though undoubtedly well-intentioned and aimed at remedying the legislative inaction, was not capable of fulfilling the requirement of fair compensation where Act No. 116/2020 Coll. imposed the condition of “particularly serious bodily harm.”

Conclusion

The Constitutional Court will now have to assess the Supreme Court’s objection, namely that granting compensation only to those injured parties who effectively no longer have any health left is inherently unjust.

Should the Constitutional Court grant the proposal, the result may be the annulment of the provisions in question that require “particularly serious bodily harm” as a precondition. This would confirm that anyone who suffers health harm as a result of mandatory vaccination or COVID-19 vaccination—regardless of its severity—may seek just compensation. It may be assumed that the amount of compensation would then be proportionate to the degree of harm under standard principles.

As for ongoing proceedings, we believe that those cases in which the degree of harm under the compensation acts is contested will await the outcome before the Constitutional Court. In contrast, claims where “particularly serious bodily harm” is clearly established may proceed without delay from the Constitutional court.

Despite the existence of inconsistent case law from general courts and, in the context of this proposal, even Supreme Court jurisprudence that failed to rectify the legislator’s error, it is of fundamental importance that the Supreme Court agreed with our proposal to remove the disproportionately strict condition from both laws.

The team of AK Sudolská

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[1] Unofficial translation.

[2] Unofficial translation.

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